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ABSTRACT
New information technology has reduced marginal production and distribution costs of information
goods to negligible levels and promises to revolutionize many industries. Unpaid copies of digital
products can be as good as paid first-generation copies, and their availability can undermine the
ability of sellers to cover first-copy costs. As a result, unpaid distribution has emerged as a major
issue facing the music and movie industries in the past few years. Using survey data on movie
consumption by about 500 University of Pennsylvania college students, we ask whether unpaid
consumption of movies displaces paid consumption. Employing a variety of cross-sectional and
longitudinal  empirical  approaches,  we  find  large  and  statistically  significant  evidence  of
displacement. In what we view as the most appropriate empirical specifications, we find that unpaid
first consumption reduces paid consumption by about 1 unit. Unpaid second consumption has a
smaller effect, about 0.20 units. These estimates indicate that unpaid consumption, which makes up
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waldfogj@wharton.upenn.eduNew information technology, which has reduced marginal production and 
distribution costs of information goods to negligible levels, promises to revolutionize 
many industries.  Zero marginal costs can allow higher profits and lower prices.  
Moreover, costless distribution allows sellers to use innovative marketing strategies such 
as free samples with partial functionality (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  But once the genie 
of negligible marginal costs is out of the bottle, the same technological changes that 
empower sellers can also enable unpaid distribution and redistribution.  With digital 
goods, unpaid copies can be as good as paid first-generation goods, and the willingness 
and ability of consumers to share copies can undermine the ability of sellers to cover 
first-copy costs.  Unless unpaid distribution stimulates demand for complementary goods 
which can continue to generate revenue, the information industries may ultimately suffer. 
  Over the past five years, unpaid distribution (variously known as “file-sharing” 
and “piracy”) has emerged as a major issue facing producers of information products 
such as music and movies.  After revenue growth for many years, US music industry 
revenue has declined from 2000 to 2003 and was flat in 2004, and many in the industry 
blame file-sharing 
1.  The motion picture industry is similarly concerned about piracy, 
although overall Hollywood revenue continues to rise even if theatrical box office 
receipts have been flat over the past few years.
2
While it is perhaps surprising at first blush, theory gives no unambiguous 
guidance on the effect of unpaid consumption on sales.  On one side, unpaid copies are 
                                                 
1 See the RIAA’s “AntiPiracy” at http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp  as well as the RIAA’s 
“2004 Yearend Statistics” at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/2004yearEndStats.pdf  (both 
accessed December 15, 2005). 
2 The Motion Picture Association of America estimates $3.5 billion in losses to various forms of piracy in 
2002.  See the MPAA’s “2003 Piracy Fact Sheet Overview” at 
http://www.mpaa.org/PiracyFactSheets/PiracyFactSheetOverview.pdf (accessed December 15, 2005). 
  1close substitutes for paid copies, particularly in music, suggesting that unpaid 
consumption would simply displace paid consumption.  While MP3 files contain less 
information than, say, CDs, many listeners find the compressed files to contain nearly the 
same information.  And possession of an unpaid music file allows its user all the 
activities available to the owner of a purchased CD. 
Movies are different in a few respects that suggest less displacement by unpaid 
use.  First, while an unpaid copy of a movie, on CD or DVD, contains the same 
information as a legal DVD and allows a very similar experience to home video 
ownership, home video is an imperfect substitute for theatrical viewing.  Second, as 
economic theorists have emphasized, information sharing can stimulate paid consumption 
if the sharing remains small-scale
3.  The logic is simple: two isolated persons valuing a 
movie DVD at $11 each will not purchase it for its $20 price.  If they plan to share, then 
the sum of their valuations exceeds the price, and they will purchase it together.  The 
large size of video files has kept peer-to-peer sharing at small scale, largely through 
traditional “sneakernet” file transmission.
4   The possibility for file-sharing to stimulate 
paid demand therefore seems more real in movies than in music. 
To date there have been numerous academic studies of the effect of file-sharing 
on revenue in the music industry.
5  Most, but not all, studies find that file sharing 
depresses sales, although much less than one for one.  That is, much of the music 
consumption occurring through file sharing would not have occurred in the absence of 
                                                 
3 See Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman (1999) and Varian (2000). 
4 A user dons his sneakers and carries a DVD from his friend’s house to his DVD-burning computer.   See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sneakernet, accessed December 15, 2005. 
5 See, for example Blackburn (2004), Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2004), Zentner (2004), Rob and 
Waldfogel (2004), Bounie, Bourreau and Waelbrock (2005), Hong (2005), Hui and Png (2003), and 
Leibowitz (2003). 
  2file sharing.  As a result, file sharing tends to increase social welfare by more than the 
revenue loss to sellers (ignoring any effects on the supply of music).  This study 
examines the displacement question in the context of the motion picture industry.  Using 
survey data on movie consumption by about 500 University of Pennsylvania college 
students, we ask whether unpaid consumption (of burned or downloaded copies) 
stimulates or depresses demand for various forms of paid consumption, including 
theatrical, television, rental, and DVD ownership.  The surveyed population is far from 
representative of the US population – respondents are richer and are more likely to have 
broadband Internet connections as well as access to DVD burning hardware.  While 
results are therefore not representative of the entire US, the effects documented for this 
population are suggestive of effects that might operate more broadly as technologies 
continue to diffuse. 
Using a variety of cross-sectional and longitudinal empirical approaches, we find 
large and statistically significant evidence of displacement.  In what we view as the most 
appropriate empirical specifications, we find that unpaid first consumption reduces paid 
consumption by about 1 unit.  Unpaid second consumption has a smaller effect, about 
0.20 units.  These estimates indicate that unpaid consumption, which makes up 5.2 
percent of movie viewing in our sample, reduced paid consumption in our sample by 3.5 
percent. 
 
I. Theoretical Background 
  Prior to file sharing, each consumer has some willingness to pay for each movie.  
The distribution of these consumer valuations make up the demand curve for the movie.  
  3The advent of file sharing has two kinds of effects. First, even holding constant the 
distribution of valuations, with file sharing, all kinds of consumers – with valuations 
above or below the market price – can now get access without paying.  The sales 
displacement and welfare effects of this – worked out in section  I.1 below – depend on 
whether the unpaid consumption would have manifested itself as paid consumption in the 
absence of file sharing. 
1. Supply and Demand 
  Supply and demand provides a useful framework for thinking about the sales 
displacement and welfare consequences of unpaid consumption.  For this discussion 
suppose that the marginal cost of production and distribution is zero. 
  First, consider the market prior to file sharing, in figure 1a.  Sellers sell B0 units at 
a price of P.  The area under the demand curve is divided into three regions, consumer 
surplus (the consumer valuations in excess of the price they pay), revenue (P* B0), and 
deadweight loss (foregone mutually beneficial transactions for units with consumer 
valuation above the marginal cost but below the price, so no transaction occurs).  When 
unpaid consumption is feasible, its effect depends on which units are obtained without 
payment, whether they are those with valuation above or below P. 
  Start by considering an extreme case in which only units with valuation below P 
are obtained without payment.  This results in the situation in figure 1b.  Sellers continue 
to sell B0 units at a price of P.  Another S units are obtained without payment.  Hence, in 






Here, the deadweight loss prevailing prior to unpaid consumption becomes consumer 
  4surplus, while sellers remain as well off as before.  File sharing makes society 
unambiguously better off. 
  Next, consider a case where all of the unpaid consumption is drawn from situation 
where consumer valuations exceed P.  This is depicted in figure 1c.  Now (B0 – S) units 
are transacted at P, while S units are consumed without payment.  The sum of producer 
and consumer surplus is the same as before, as is deadweight loss.  But S*P is transferred 
from producers to consumers.  Here, paid consumption falls by the exact amount of 












), the more welfare gain that file sharing brings to society as a whole.  As the rate of 
displacement grows (in absolute value, toward -1), the social gain from file sharing falls 
to zero.  The effect of unpaid consumption becomes a pure transfer from sellers to 






  An important caveat bears mention: it is possible that unpaid consumption 
displaces sales and changes the nature or volume of movies that get made.  To the extent 
that our estimates have welfare implications, they are implications for welfare, given 
which movies are being made. 
 
2. File Sharing and Changing Demand   
  In addition to allowing unpaid access regardless of one’s valuation, file sharing 
can also stimulate demand via two channels.  First, small-scale information sharing can 
stimulate demand if it makes a group of consumers willing, as a group, to purchase a 
  5product that no group member would have purchased alone.   Two features of music file 
sharing prevent it from remaining small in scale, in turn making the suggestion that file-
sharing would stimulate music sales rather far-fetched.  First, file compression makes it 
fast to download music, particularly over broadband connections.  A typical song can be 
downloaded in a few seconds.  Second, with peer-to-peer (P2P), if one person purchases 
an album, it becomes available to all Internet-connected persons willing to download.  As 
a result, file-sharing is potentially unlimited in scale. 
  File sharing in movies remains fundamentally different.  Even compressed, a 
typical Hollywood movie is about 4 gigabytess.  Using the newest downloading 
technologies (e.g. BitTorrent), downloading a movie takes between 30 minutes and 8 
hours, depending on how many persons have already made the file available online.
6  
Similarly, DVD copying requires about 90 minutes using a typical computer setup and 
DVD burner.  DVD copying is generally quicker and results in higher quality copies than 
downloading.  As a result, the dominant form of file sharing in movies is DVD copying, 
rather than downloading.  By its nature, DVD copying is smaller in scale than P2P 
copying, making it more plausible that file-sharing could stimulate sales.  On the other 
hand, while consumers listen to some albums repeatedly, they may wish to watch movies 
only once.  That is, movies and music may differ in the extent to which initial 
consumption is a substitute or a complement for subsequent use.  Perhaps even more than 
in music, the effect of file sharing on movie industry revenue is theoretically ambiguous. 
                                                 
6 “Cable and DSL modem users can expect an average of 25 megabytes per hour, sometimes slower if the 
swarm is small with less than 2 seeders. On a good day with a big swarm, however, you can download a 
5MB song within 3 minutes, and a 900MB movie within 60 minutes.” 
http://netforbeginners.about.com/od/peersharing/a/torrenthandbook_4.htm , accessed 2/24/2005 
 
  6Second, file-sharing may increase consumers’ willingness to purchase by 
allowing him to sample the product prior to purchase.  Shapiro and Varian (1999) 
emphasize that free samples of information products can stimulate subsequent paid 
consumption.  The samples they envision are incomplete versions of the product.  Even if 
unpaid access to movies stimulates interest in movies, it is not clear that consumers 
would be willing to pay for something that they have already obtained without payment.  
First, unpaid copies are generally the entire movie rather than an appetite-enhancing free 
sample.  And, second, since unpaid DVD copies are nearly identical, there is no need to 
pay for an upgrade to a higher-quality experience to see the movie again.  Still, it is 
possible that consumers, once they know they like a movie, would be willing to pay for a 
legal copy for to continue to watch. 
 
3. Industry Background 
  In 1980 box office revenue provided the majority of revenue to the US motion 
picture industry.  The box office share has declined steadily since then. The US film 
industry generated $45 billion in revenue in 2004.  The box office share in 2004 was 17 
percent, while home video accounted for nearly half.
7
  Between 2000 and 2004, overall industry revenue grew 39 percent in real terms.
8  
In contrast to the music industry whose concerns about piracy are motivated in part by 
sharp recent revenue declines, the movie industry continues to experience robust growth 
in revenue, driven largely by the growth in DVD sales.  Concerns about piracy, while 
                                                 
7 See http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/mpa2004.htm, accessed December 13, 2005. 
8 Ibid. 
  7substantiated in many instances (see http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/), are not 
additionally fueled by falling industry revenue. 
  
II. Data 
The data for this study are derived from a series of surveys administered to over 
500 Penn undergraduates in Spring and late Fall 2005.  In each survey, students see a list 
of the top 50 movies from each of the previous 3 years (2002-2004 in the Spring, 2003-
2005 year to date for the Fall).  For each movie they are asked whether they saw it, as 
well as the sequence by which they saw it.  Respondents can have seen a movie by any 
(and all) of 4 paid methods: theater, television, rental, and purchase; as well as by 
either or both of two unpaid means: by viewing a downloaded copy, or by viewing a 
burned copy of a legally obtained copy (generally DVD).  Thus, for each movie seen, a 
respondent enters a “1” under the mode they first saw it, a “2” under the mode by which 
they saw it next (if they saw it more than once), and so on. 
In addition to their movie consumption, the survey also asks about family income, 
respondent race and age, speed of Internet access, and three variables related to their 
interest in movies: how often they go to movie theaters, how many movies they own, and 
their level of interest in movies (on a five-point scale).  The sample includes nearly 
21,000 instances of movie consumption.  For analysis we include only respondents who 
made no mistakes in reporting their sequences.
9  This brings the usable sample down to 
470 individuals. 
                                                 
9 We discard data for individuals who indicate that they saw a movie by multiple means but do not indicate 
the sequence. 
  8Table 1 describes the sample.  The mean age is 18, and the age range is between 
17 and 22.  Nearly a quarter of the respondents are Asian, 6 percent are black, and 6 
percent are Hispanic. Respondents are from families of above-average income: Nearly 30 
percent of the sample reports family income in excess of $250,000.  Another 37 percent 
reports family income of $100,000-$250,000.  Just 10 percent of respondents report 
family income below $50,000.   
Nearly half (46%) report a “typical” level of interest in movies.  Nearly a third 
report above-average interest in movies.  Only a fifth report below average interest in 
movies.  Respondents own a mean (median) of 38 (20) movies, and they go to movie 
theaters 1.6 (1) time per month.  Internet access is ubiquitous among the respondents: 98 
percent of respondents report high-speed access in 2005, up steadily from 70 percent in 
2002. 
For the 150 movies in each survey, respondents report an average of 54.2 
instances of paid consumption and 3.0 instances of unpaid consumption.  Theatrical 
consumption is the most common form, accounting for nearly half, followed by rental (20 
percent), television (16 percent) and purchase (15 percent).  The two forms of unpaid 
consumption account for 5.2 percent of consumption, the majority (3.1 of 5.2) burned and 
the remainder (2.1 of 5.2 percent) downloaded. 
A particular movie is frequently viewed through more than one medium by a 
respondent.  The bottom part of Table 1 breaks consumption down by medium and by 
viewing order.  While respondents engage in 57.2 episodes of consumption, they see on 
average only 44.5 separate movies.  Virtually all theatrical consumption occurs on first 
viewing; and theatrical viewing is the way that nearly 60 percent of consumption 
  9sequences begin.  The other major medium for first viewing is rental (8.3 of 44.5, or 19 
percent).  The other media account for relatively few first viewings; on the other hand, 
first viewings via those media account for most of the viewings via those media.  For 
example only 4 percent (1.8 of 44.5) first viewings use unpaid copies.  But these 
viewings represent most of the unpaid consumption.  To put this another way, unpaid 
consumption is rare; but when it occurs, it usually occurs on first viewing.  
The vast majority of second viewings are on purchased copies, television, or 
rental copies.  As with first viewings, unpaid consumption accounts for a small fraction 
of second viewings.  At the same time, over a quarter of unpaid consumption occurs on 
the second viewing. 
The first column of Table 2 shows consumption paths that begin with theatrical 
and rental consumption.  The length of the sequences varies with the medium of initial 
consumption.  Of the sequences beginning with rental, less than fifteen percent are 
viewed through another medium.  Of the sequences that start in the theater, far more – 
over a third – continue to another medium, roughly 10 percent each to purchase, rental, 
and television with another few percent subsequently consumed via unpaid means. 
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
Before beginning the detailed analysis, it is helpful to distinguish two questions of 
interest.  First, to what extent does an instance of unpaid consumption displace paid 
consumption?  Said another way, what is the rate of displacement?  Second – if there is 
displacement – how much paid consumption is displaced by unpaid consumption?   Or, 
  10what is the amount of displacement?  This is calculated as the volume of unpaid 
consumption times the rate of displacement. 
We have two basic approaches to measuring the effect of unpaid consumption on 
paid consumption.  First, we can make straight use of the cross section, asking whether 
people who engage in more unpaid consumption engage in less paid consumption.  
Implementing this approach requires a way of predicting how many movies respondents 
would have paid to consume in the absence of any unpaid consumption.  The main 
challenge to this approach is that persons who like movies may like them through various 
media.  That is, people who like movies may both like to pay for them and to consume 
them without paying.  If it is not possible to control for all determinants of individuals’ 
interest in movies, then unobserved heterogeneity will tend to induce a positive 
relationship between unpaid and paid consumption, even if the causal relationship is 
negative. 
The structure of our data allows a second, panel approach.  The data include 
individuals’ movie consumption, by medium, yearly 2002(3)-2004(5).  We can include 
individual fixed effects – which control for the individuals’ vintage-constant interest in 
movies – then ask whether persons with higher unpaid consumption in some vintages 
have higher or lower paid consumption of movies from those vintages. 
Our sequencing information allows us to use ask slightly more pointed questions.  
It makes no sense for a downloaded second viewing to affect first viewing.  Indeed – to 
the extent that a second viewing by unpaid means mechanically follows paid theatrical 
consumption – naïve cross sectional regressions could perversely show positive 
relationships when analyzed without regard for sequence.  We can more sensibly instead 
  11ask whether unpaid first consumption increases or decreases paid first consumption.  And 




1.  Cross Sectional Approaches 
The cross sectional approach to the displacement question asks whether people 
with more unpaid viewings have fewer paid viewings.   As a first pass at this approach 
we can simply plot first viewings by paid means against first viewings by unpaid means, 
in Figure 2.  The line is a smoothed description of the relationship, and it is essentially 
flat.  One interpretation of this flat relationship is that unpaid consumption does not 
displace paid consumption.  Yet, persons who like movies more might simply engage in 
more paid and unpaid consumption, which would tend to mask any substitution that 
operates.  Indeed, when we break our respondents down by self-reported interest in 
movies, the persons with high interest in movies engage in both more paid and more 
unpaid consumption.  To meaningfully measure displacement using a cross sectional 
approach, we need to find variables that predict the counterfactual paid consumption 
absent any unpaid consumption.  We have three main variables for this task, the 
respondent’s interest in movies on a five-point scale, the size of his or her home video 
library, and how frequently he or she sees a movie in a theater. 
To implement this approach in a regression, define: 
j
i B  = the number of paid movies that person i watches for the j
th time (i.e. the 
number of n
th viewings for this person),  
j
i S  =  the number of unpaid movies that person i watches for the j
th time;  
  12Xi = characteristics of person i such as the level of interest in movies (fan dummy, 
size of movie collection, frequency of movie theater attendance); 
j
i ε = unobserved determinants of tendency to make j
th viewings for person i. 
 
We can then estimate models of the form: 
1 1 1 1 1
i i i i S X B ε α β + + = , or       (1) 
2 1 21 2 22 2 2
i i i i i S S X B ε α α β + + + = .   (2) 
 
In effect a model like (1) asks whether people with more unpaid first viewings have 
fewer paid first viewings, after controlling for determinants of paid first consumption.  
The second model is similar but examines second paid consumption, with possible 
relationships between both unpaid first and second consumption on paid second 
consumption.  That is, not only can decisions to engage in second unpaid viewings affect 
paid second viewings.  Unpaid first viewings, if they reduce the tendency for a second 
viewing, can also affect the tendency for a paid second viewing. 
  Unless the controls are exhaustive, unobserved heterogeneity is a looming 
concern with models of this sort:  persons who watch movies without paying may simply 
like movies a lot, even beyond the capacity of our control variables to distinguish among 
persons in the sample. If so, then our estimate of the extent of displacement (the α 
coefficients) will be biased upward, that is, against a finding of sales displacement. 
Table 3 reports results, overall and disaggregated by each paid medium.  The first 
five columns are regressions of the number of first paid viewings in this medium on the 
number of first unpaid viewings (either downloaded or burned).  Controls include the fan 
  13dummy, the movie library, and the individual’s monthly theater visits.  People with larger 
libraries, more frequent theater patronage, and higher levels of movie fandom have more 
paid first viewings.  The coefficient on unpaid first viewings is negative but 
insignificantly different from zero.  The second column examines theatrical first viewing.  
Here the coefficient of interest is -0.12, below its standard error of 0.16 and therefore not  
statistically significant. 
Columns (6)-(10) are regressions of second viewings on controls and the numbers 
of unpaid first and second viewings. Persons with one more unpaid first viewing have 
0.34 fewer second paid viewings.  The coefficients for television, rental, and purchase are 
all negative, and the rental coefficient is large and significant (-0.26). 
Column (6) also indicates that persons with more unpaid second viewings have 
more paid second viewings as well (0.42 and significant).  Most of this reflects additional 
rental: persons who watch more unpaid second viewings engage in more rented second 
viewings.
10
If one takes these models literally – and causally – then the effect of each 
additional first unpaid viewing is the sum of 0.01 and -0.34, or a reduction of 0.33 in paid 
viewings.  Each second-time unpaid viewing, on the other hand, raises paid viewing by 
0.42.   There are many reasons to doubt a causal interpretation, however.  First, as already 
emphasized, there is unobserved heterogeneity.  People who like movies will tend to 
engage in more paid and unpaid consumption.  This can look like a stimulating effect of 
unpaid consumption on paid consumption even if it is not. 
                                                 
10 We also estimated models that disaggregate unpaid consumption into distinct downloaded and burned 
components.  The distinct categories have statistically indistinguishable effects, so here and below we 
report only models with overall unpaid consumption as an explanatory variable. 
  14More convincing estimates require ways of circumventing the unobserved 
heterogeneity.   A natural strategy is instrumental variables.  Our survey includes 
information on broadband and DVD-burner access which seem like promising 
instruments for unpaid consumption (see Rob and Waldfogel, 2004; Zentner, 2004).  In 
our data these technological access variables bear no significant relationships with unpaid 
consumption.  These variables fail as instruments for three reasons.  First, broadband 
access is virtually ubiquitous, so there is little variation.  Second, even if there were more 
variation in broadband access, most unpaid consumption copies are obtained via copying 
rather than downloading, which reduces the usefulness of access speed in predicting 
unpaid consumption.  And while access to DVD-burning hardware would seem a 
promising predictor, whether one has access to this technology may be less important 
than whether one’s friends have such access.  We are left without a promising IV 
approach. 
The sequential nature of consumption allows a different strategy.  We can restrict 
attention to second viewings for the subset of movies with a first paid consumption, then 
ask how much paid second consumption is displaced by an unpaid second consumption.  
On average a third of movies first viewed at the theater are subsequently viewed by 
another means (see Table 2).  By restricting attention to the movies first viewed, say, at 
the theater, we grow closer to holding constant individuals’ interest in the movies in 
question.  We can then ask how the number of paid second viewings, per movie first seen 
in the theater, relates to the number of unpaid second viewings, again relative to the 
number first seen in the theater. 
  15Table 2 offers a simple implementation of this approach.  The table divides survey 
respondents into two groups, those who engage in no unpaid consumption during the 
sample, those who engage in some.   Table 2 also reports these sequences separately for 
persons who report no unpaid consumption as well as those engaging in unpaid 
consumption.  A comparison of these groups’ consumption sequences provides some 
suggestive evidence of displacement following a first (paid) viewing. 
For persons with no unpaid consumption, 34.9 percent of movies first viewing in 
a theater are viewed a second time by another paid means.  For the persons who engage 
in some unpaid consumption, only 30.1 percent of movies first viewed in a theater have a 
second, paid viewing, while 4.5 percent have an unpaid second viewing.  That is, both 
groups follow up a first theatrical viewing with the same tendency to view the movie 
through a second medium.  But the paid viewing by those who sometimes steal is lower 
by almost exactly the amount of their unpaid consumption.  This suggests one-for-one 
displacement.
11  A similar exercise to second consumption following first viewing of a 
rental copy yields similar implied displacement.
12 While suggestive, these calculations 
control for nothing. 
Table 4 implements a regression analogue to the comparison in Table 3.  Column 
1 is a regression of the ratio of paid second viewings to theatrical first viewings on the 
ratio of unpaid second viewings to theatrical first viewings.  The coefficient on the 
unpaid ratio is –0.27 and nearly statistically significant, indicating that an unpaid second 
viewing displaces 0.27 paid second viewings.  The second column regresses the number 
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  16of paid second viewings following a theatrical viewing on the number of unpaid second 
viewings following a first theatrical viewing, controlling for the number of theatrical first 
viewings.  The displacement coefficient is again –0.27 and significant.  Columns (3) and 
(4) repeat the exercise for movies with a first paid rental consumption.  Given that 
subsequent consumption follows initial rental in only 15 percent of consumption 
sequences, we do not have much scope for finding relationships among the movies first 
viewed through rental.  And, indeed, second unpaid consumption of movies first seen 
through rental has no statistically discernible displacement effect on second paid 
consumption. 
These estimates that come closer to controlling for unobservable tendencies to 
buy movies provide some evidence of displacement.  Unfortunately, this approach does 
not provide an estimate of the displacement effect of first unpaid viewing. 
 
2. Longitudinal  Approach 
The problem with the cross sectional estimates is that the error term, containing 
the individual’s unobserved tendency to pay for movies, is correlated with his tendency to 
engage in unpaid consumption.  The solution is to purge the error of this component.  
Longitudinal data allow this, provided that the unobservable determinant of individuals’ 
paid consumption is constant across vintages.  Because these estimates avoid this 
important form of unobserved heterogeneity, this is our preferred estimation approach, 
particularly for estimating the effect of first unpaid consumption on first paid 
consumption. 
  17The movies in the survey represent the 50 most popular (highest box office) films 
over each of the three years prior to the survey.  We can calculate the number of paid and 
unpaid consumption episodes among the films of each vintage.  We can then use the data 
as a panel, including a fixed effect to purge the error term of individuals’ vintage-
invariant interest in buying movies.  In effect, we ask whether persons who watch more 
unpaid 2005 movies, relative to 2003 movies, watch fewer paid 2005 movies, relative to 
2003 movies. 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the differences in paid and unpaid 
consumption of movies between the 2003 and 2005 vintages (for the Fall sample).  The 
smoothed line summarizes the relationship, and it is clearly negative.  Persons who 
consume more unpaid movies from 2005 relative to 2003 consume fewer paid movies 
from 2005 relative to 2003.  This looks like sales displacement. 
To test this more systematically in a regression framework, define: 
j
it B =number of paid j
th (first or second) consumption episodes by person i for 
vintage t movies,  
j
it S =number of unpaid j
th (first or second) consumption episodes by person i for 
vintage t movies, 
μi = unobserved determinants of an individual’s tendency to buy movies, 
φt= vintage effect, and  
εit= indiosyncratic error. 
We can then estimate: 
1 1 1 1 1
it t i it it S B ε φ μ β α + + + + =   and       (1) 
2 1 21 2 22 2 2
it t i it it it S S B ε φ μ β β α + + + + + = .      (2) 
  18  Table 5 reports results.
13  As before, the first five columns refer to first 
consumption episodes.  The coefficient on unpaid consumption in the first column, -0.76 
(s.e.=0.10) indicates that persons with one additional unpaid first consumption engage in 
0.76 fewer paid first consumption episodes.   Each of the by-medium coefficients is also 
negative and significant, the largest being -0.27 (theater) and -0.29 (rental). 
  The last five columns of the table examine the relationship between unpaid first 
and second consumption and paid second consumption.  Here, the coefficient on unpaid 
second consumption is -0.19 (s.e.=0.09), while the coefficient on unpaid first 
consumption is -0.24 (s.e.=0.06).   
  Interpreting the coefficients causally, a first unpaid consumption reduces paid 
consumption by 1 unit (-0.76 + -0.24).  Recall that most first consumption episodes are 
theatrical and that a third of these are followed by a second paid consumption episode.  
Hence the maximum displacement exceeds 1. 
The longitudinal displacement estimate of unpaid second consumption of –0.19 is 
similar to the Table 4 estimates of roughly –0.27 following theatrical first consumption. 
  What do these estimates mean?  On average in our data, consumption sequences 
include 1.3 viewings, so the maximum amount of conceivable displacement exceeds 
one.
14  An unpaid first consumption reduces paid consumption by 1 unit.  This is not 100 
percent displacement, but it is nearly 80 percent of the maximum possible displacement.  
                                                 
13 The models are estimated combining data from the Spring (“early”) and Fall (“late”) surveys.  Because 
early respondents report on movies 2002-2004 while late respondents report on movies 2003-2005, each 
group gets its own vintage dummies in these models. 
14 To see this imagine a first consumption in the theater followed, sometimes, by rental and/or purchase.  
Alternatively, one might begin by watching an unpaid copy and then engage on no additional paid 
consumption.  A decision to begin with an unpaid copy can therefore displace more than one paid 
consumption. 
  19An unpaid second consumption reduces second paid consumption by only about 0.2, or 
20 percent of the maximum possible displacement, by contrast. 
  In our sample individuals have an average of 1.8 unpaid first consumption 
episodes.  According to our longitudinal estimates, these unpaid first consumption 
episodes displace 1.4 paid first consumption episodes (=1.8*0.76) per person and 0.4 
second consumption episodes (=1.8*0.24).  Our respondents have an average of 0.9 
unpaid second consumption episodes, which displace 0.2 (=0.9*0.19) paid second 
consumption episodes.  Overall, then, unpaid consumption displaces an average of 2.0 
paid consumption episodes per person in the sample.  To put this another way, unpaid 
consumption reduces paid consumption episodes in the sample from a counterfactual 56.2 
to the observed 54.2, or by 3.5 percent.  
 
Conclusion 
  Unpaid consumption of movies is a small share of consumption, even in a sample 
of highly Internet connected and technically sophisticated college students from high-
income families.  Moreover, with the rapid growth of DVDs over the past few years, film 
industry revenue has grown sharply, even as theatrical attendance has been flat.  Unlike 
the music industry, which has actually experienced a pronounced downturn which is 
arguably based on file sharing, the movie industry faces smaller outward signs of a 
problem. 
  Yet, the evidence in this paper indicates that the file sharing that occurs has sharp 
displacing effects on paid consumption.   Our best estimate indicates that an unpaid first 
consumption reduces paid consumption by one unit, and an unpaid second consumption 
  20reduces paid second consumption by about a fifth of a unit.  The movie sales 
displacement rates that we estimate are much larger than displacement estimates that we 
estimate for music (Rob and Waldfogel, 2004).  The large rate of displacement suggests 
that the main effect of unpaid consumption in movies is simply to transfer revenue from 
sellers to buyers.  Unlike in music, where much unpaid consumption would not have 
occurred without file sharing, in movies unpaid consumption simply displaces paid 
consumption.  This suggests that unpaid movie consumption does not reduce deadweight 
loss. 
Why would displacement rates be so high in movies?  File sharing in movies 
remains clumsy.  Persons can choose between slow downloads and relatively easy to 
defeat DVD file protection.  If the means available for copying movies become easier to 
use, file sharing may become a very serious threat to the film industry.  The difficulty of 
obtaining unpaid copies may explain the sharp displacement.  Perhaps only highly 
motivated consumers – those placing high valuations on the movies they are copying – 
engage in file sharing today.  If file sharing were easier (and therefore more nearly 
costless), it is possible that even persons placing low valuations on movies – and who 
would therefore not otherwise consume the movie if paying – would share.  Then the 
displacement would be smaller.   
  However, even if the cost of obtaining movies without paying falls, movies 
remain different from music in their cost of consumption.  Watching a movie requires a 
few hours of undivided attention, which is costly to people.  Music, on the other hand, 
can occupy divided attention.  Hence, a person can get some use out of music he values 
very little (he can give it an experimental listen while doing something else).  To the 
  21extent that movies are costly to consume even when free, the extent of displacement per 
unpaid movie viewing may remain quite high. 
  Because the amount of unpaid consumption in the sample is small (about 5.2 
percent), the amount of displacement (3.5 percent) is small as well.  While the amount of 
displacement in the sample is small, our large estimates of the rate of displacement may 
give the movie industry a cause for concern as the technologies allowing unpaid 
consumption diffuse widely.  Sharp sales displacement effects raise difficult questions 
about the marketing of information goods that future research will need to address. 
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
movie interest  a lot less  less  same  more  a lot more
N=469 6.0%  15.4%  46.3%  23.9%  8.5% 
          
family income 
(000)  under $25  $25-$50  $50-$100
$100-
$250  over $250
N=441 3.4%  7.0%  22.7%  37.0%  29.9% 
          
 mean  median  N     
home video library  37.6  20  463     
age  18.7 18 470     
monthly theater 
visits  1.6 1  461     
          
          
DVD burner  no access 
access w/o 
ownership  own one    
N=541 21.1%  24.5%  54.4%     
          
race white  Asian  black  Hispanic   
 59.6%  24.5%  5.5%  5.5%   
          
          
Viewing Modes on N
th Viewing  
viewing mode  all  first  second  third   
theater 25.5  25.4  0.1  0.0   
television 8.9  4.9  3.3  0.6   
rental 11.2  8.3  2.7  0.2   
purchase 8.5  4.0  3.8  0.6   
total paid  54.2  42.7  9.8  1.4   
          
downloaded 1.2  0.8  0.3  0.1   
burned 1.8  1.0  0.6  0.2   
total unpaid  3.0  1.8  0.9  0.3   
          
total 57.2  44.5  10.7  1.7   
 






total   20687 9315  11372 
Sequences Starting With      
theater 56.9%  58.5%  55.6% 
television 11.0%  11.5%  10.6% 
rental 18.7%  19.2%  18.3% 
purchase 9.1%  10.0%  8.3% 
downloading 1.7%  0.0%  3.0% 
burning 2.3%  0.0%  4.1% 
      
Following First Viewing in Theater 
no subsequent  65.3%  65.1%  65.4% 
television 9.8%  10.7%  9.0% 
rental 9.7%  9.8%  9.7% 
purchase 12.8%  14.4%  11.4% 
downloading 0.8%  0.0%  1.5% 
burning 1.6%  0.0%  3.0% 
      
Total paid  32.3%  34.9%  30.1% 
Total unpaid  2.4%  0.0%  4.5% 
      
Following First Viewing through Rental 
no subsequent  86.7%  87.5%  85.9% 
theater 0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 
television 6.4%  5.9%  6.9% 
purchase 4.5%  6.5%  2.8% 
downloading 0.6%  0.0%  1.1% 
burning 1.8%  0.0%  3.3% 
      
Total paid  11.0%  12.5%  9.7% 
Total unpaid  2.3%  0.0%  4.3% 
  25Table 3: Cross Sectional Displacement Estimates for First and Second Viewings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9)  (10) 
Viewing:  first first first first first  second second second  second  second 
  buy  theater  tv rental  purchase  buy  theater  tv rental  purchase 
Unpaid First 
Viewings 
0.0062 -0.1200 0.0926 -0.0030 0.0367 -0.3351  0.0120 0.0222 -0.2636 -0.1057 




      0.4186  -0.0070  0.0136  0.5347  -0.1227 
        (0.1587)**  (0.0092)  (0.1002)  (0.0720)**  (0.0900) 
fan==2  9.6677 4.1441 1.8201 4.0491 -0.3456 1.4561  -0.0532  0.8772 0.4692 0.1630 
 (3.4942)**  (2.8841)  (1.3620)  (2.0455)*  (1.2045)  (1.8299) (0.1062) (1.1556)  (0.8300)  (1.0380) 
fan==3  16.9425  9.8594 1.6728 5.1814 0.2289 3.5706  -0.0086  1.0674 1.4291 1.0827 
 (3.1999)**  (2.6412)**  (1.2473)  (1.8732)**  (1.1030)  (1.6757)*  (0.0973)  (1.0582) (0.7601) (0.9506) 
fan==4  24.2538  15.5082  3.8026 5.5389 -0.5959 6.9474  -0.0038  3.4337 1.2330 2.2845 
  (3.4618)** (2.8574)** (1.3494)** (2.0266)**  (1.1933) (1.8137)**  (0.1053)  (1.1454)** (0.8227)  (1.0288)* 
fan==5  28.1352  17.7141  3.9585 7.8630 -1.4004 6.5046  -0.0696  3.6289 0.5197 2.4256 
 (4.0252)**  (3.3224)**  (1.5690)*  (2.3564)**  (1.3875) (2.1080)**  (0.1224)  (1.3312)** (0.9562)  (1.1958)* 
own  0.0288  0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0061 0.0333  0.0320 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0311 
 (0.0120)*  (0.0099)  (0.0047)  (0.0071)  (0.0042)**  (0.0064)** (0.0004)  (0.0040)  (0.0029)  (0.0036)** 
often  3.2080 3.2493 -0.5044 0.6606 -0.1975 1.1235  0.0114  0.1493 0.6326 0.3302 
  (0.6959)**  (0.5744)**  (0.2713) (0.4074) (0.2399)  (0.3655)** (0.0212)  (0.2308)  (0.1658)**  (0.2074) 
Constant  19.2457  10.1857  3.3753 2.4537 3.2310 3.0394  0.0525  1.2220 0.6058 1.1591 
 (3.0131)**  (2.4870)**  (1.1745)**  (1.7639)  (1.0386)**  (1.5780) (0.0916) (0.9965)  (0.7158)  (0.8951) 
Observations  454 454 454 454 454 454  454  454 454 454 
R-squared 0.28 0.25 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.22  0.01  0.06 0.18 0.21 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.         
  26Table 4: Displacement on Second Viewing, Given First Paid Viewing 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Paid 2nd /  
First at Theater 
# Paid 2nd after 
Theater 
Paid 2nd /  
First thru Rental 
# Paid 2nd after 
Rental 
Unpaid 2nd / Theater  -0.2743       
 (0.1454)       
# Unpaid 2nd after Theater    -0.2726     
   (0.1608)    
# First in Theater    0.3592     
   (0.0213)**     
Unpaid 2nd / Rental      -0.1641   
     (0.1305)   
# Unpaid 2nd after Rental        0.0182 
      (0.0506) 
# First thru Rental        0.1195 
      (0.0111)** 
fan==2  0.0172 -0.0757 -0.0848 -0.3767 
  (0.0476) (1.2739) (0.0499) (0.4733) 
fan==3 0.0532  0.0661  -0.0644  -0.4225 
  (0.0435) (1.1817) (0.0460) (0.4383) 
fan==4 0.1123  0.9524  -0.0511  -0.3488 
 (0.0471)*  (1.3001)  (0.0496)  (0.4701) 
fan==5  0.0575 -0.1557 -0.1185 -0.1298 
 (0.0548)  (1.5111)  (0.0568)*  (0.5443) 
own  0.0009 0.0260 0.0003 0.0021 
 (0.0002)**  (0.0044)**  (0.0002)*  (0.0016) 
often  0.0015 0.0606 -0.0012 0.0079 
  (0.0095) (0.2638) (0.0098) (0.0940) 
Constant  0.2170 -2.1084 0.1606 0.1148 
  (0.0410)** (1.1135) (0.0437)** (0.4147) 
Observations  452 452 397 397 
R-squared  0.11 0.52 0.03 0.28 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
  27Table 5: Longitudinal Displacement Estimates for First and Second Viewings 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Viewing:  first first first first first  second second second second second 
  buy  theater  tv rental  purchase  buy  theater  tv rental  purchase 
Unpaid First 
Viewings 
-0.7579 -0.2652 -0.1186 -0.2947 -0.0793 -0.2443 0.0013 -0.1188 -0.0351 -0.0917 




      -0.1944  -0.0034  -0.0423  0.0176  -0.1663 
        (0.0862)*  (0.0055)  (0.0611)  (0.0417)  (0.0530)** 
early_d2003  0.9531 0.3567 0.2336 0.1297 0.2331 0.5010 -0.0136 0.1813 0.1098 0.2236 
  (0.2818)**  (0.2041) (0.1490) (0.1748)  (0.1097)*  (0.1722)** (0.0109)  (0.1220)  (0.0833)  (0.1058)* 
early_d2004 -1.9830 -0.3221 -0.4335 -0.9954 -0.2320 -1.2785 -0.0138 -0.5000 -0.2274 -0.5373 
 (0.2822)**  (0.2044)  (0.1493)**  (0.1750)**  (0.1099)*  (0.1718)** (0.0109) (0.1217)**  (0.0831)**  (0.1056)** 
late_d2004  -0.2637 0.0741 -0.5439 0.1750 0.0311 -0.2853 0.0147 -0.3420 0.0669 -0.0248 
 (0.2577)  (0.1867)  (0.1363)**  (0.1598)  (0.1003)  (0.1567)  (0.0099) (0.1110)** (0.0758)  (0.0963) 
late_d2005  -6.3243 -0.9934 -1.7435 -2.3790 -1.2084 -3.2709 0.0149 -1.1645 -0.8565 -1.2648 
  (0.2246)** (0.1627)** (0.1188)** (0.1393)** (0.0875)** (0.1365)**  (0.0086)  (0.0967)** (0.0660)** (0.0839)** 
Constant  13.9864  7.5657 1.9289 3.0669 1.4249 3.7833 0.0189 1.3420 0.9495 1.4729 
  (0.1334)** (0.0967)** (0.0706)** (0.0828)** (0.0520)** (0.0824)** (0.0052)** (0.0583)** (0.0398)** (0.0506)** 
Observations  2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Number of 
individuals 
541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 
R-squared 0.43 0.04 0.14 0.24 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.11 0.15 0.19 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
  28Figure 1 
a: No Unpaid Consumption 
 
1.b Paid and Unpaid: Low Valuation File Sharing 
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1c. High Valuation File Sharing 
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